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POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE JURY'S VERDICT SINCE 
IT CLEARLY PREPONDERATES IN FAVOR QF THE APPELLANT 
Counsel for the respondent is correct in stating that the 
bvorable to the verdict 
should be overturned, 
that indicate that the 
evidence must be viewed in a light most f 
in determining whether a jury's verdict 
However, counsel cites few, if any, facts 
evidence when viewed in such light justifies affirmation of the 
verdict. 
The evidence to support the jury1^ verdict was so slight 
and unconvincing that the verdict is plainly unreasonable and 
unjust. The only facts which could support the jury's verdict 
icy condition when she 
periodically salted or 
are that the appellant was aware of the 
traversed the area, and the respondent 
sanded the parking lot and attempted to clear the frozen drains. 
To the contrary, the facts supporting a verdict for the appellant 
are that the bank held the lot open for customer use at all hours 
during the day; there was a large unnatural accumulation of snow 
and ice at the time of the occurrence? the bank had actual 
knowledge of the icy condition and understood the danger to 
invitees; the bank did not salt or sand the parking lot until 
7:30 a.m. or 8:00 a.m. and never did so oh weekends unless there 
was a major storm; the bank posted no warnings of the dangerous 
condition; and, when the appellant was injured, the top level of 
the parking terrace was covered with ice and had not been salted 
or sanded. (T.528-532, 603, 634-635, 71lJ-714,' 826-827, 839-841, 
847-852) 
Given the bank's required duty of care to business 
invitees, it is clear that the bank failed to exercise due care 
and thus breached its duty to the appellant* Clearly the weight 
of the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, preponderates in favor of the appellant and 
the evidence is insufficient to support it. To hold otherwise is 
plainly unreasonable and unjust, 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT BANK CANNOT AVAIL ITSELF OF 
THE APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO AVOID THE DANGEROUS CONDITION 
SINCE THE BANK'S NEGLIGENCE FAR OUTWEIGHED ANY 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OF THE APPELLANT. 
The duty required of the appellant, a business invitee, 
was to exercise reasonable care for her own safety and 
protection. Counsel's reliance upon Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 
P.2d 867 (Utah 1978) and Moore v. Burton Lumber and Hardware 
Company, 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981) in support of his argument that 
because the plaintiff did not completely avoid the parking 
terrace, she was negligent and therefore the jury's verdict was 
justified is not well taken. . Neither the Ellertson nor Moore 
cases strictly addressed the duty owed to a "business invitee" as 
compared to a licensee. Generally, a business invitee is one who 
enters or remains on the premises for the benefit of the invitor, 
or for mutual benefit and advantage of both invitor and invitee. 
Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 694 P.2d 433 (Kan. 1985) 
Although the Ellertson case speaks in terms of an invitee in 
commenting on a dangerous condition, that case is more accurately 
2 
categorized as one involving a licensee. The Ellertson case 
involved a plaintiff who, at his neighbors request, assisted in 
untangling the neighbor's horse and as a result was injured. 
Thus the Ellertson language indicating that the owner of a 
premises has no duty to warn or protect an invitee except to 
observe the universal standard of reasonable care, is 
distinguishable from the standard of dare ordinarily applied 
toward a business invitee. The owner of ^ business premises owes 
a duty to the invitee to use ordinary caire to keep the premises 
reasonably safe and to warn invitees of 
also must provide business invitees with 
from the property. 
any hidden dangers and 
safe ingress and egress 
Piedalue v. Clirjton Elementary School 
District No. 32, 692 P. 2d 20 (Mont. 1984) The evidence is clear 
that the bank failed to exercise reasonable care in remedying the 
dangerous unnatural condition and fa|iled to provide the 
appellant with a safe ingress and egress. 
In Moore v. Burton Lumber and Hardware Company, the 
evidence was apparently unclear as to whether the plaintiff was 
an invitee or a mere licensee since phe defendant disputed 
plaintiff's claim that it had given him permission to use a 
radial arm saw at an agreed price. ^ee Moore at 867, and 
footnote 2. The Court made a significant holding regarding the 
defenses of assumption of risk and contr (Lbutory negligence when 
it clarified that neither are a complete bar to recovery, but 
should be treated in a comparative matter .| See Moore at 870-871. 
See also Jacobsen v. Structo-Lite, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980) 
Instruction No. 25 phrased the appellantfb duty as a requirement 
3 
to avoid and left the impression that unless she completely 
avoided the hazard, she should be completely barred from 
recovery. The instruction inaccurately described the appellant's 
duty of care and constituted prejudicial error. 
The language of Moore relied upon by defendant's counsel 
is clearly dicta which cannot be controlling since it only 
addresses the limited issue of the trial Court's harmless error 
in failing to instruct the jury on a duty to warn. The Moore 
case does not hold that unless an adult avoids a dangerous 
condition, he or she is to be completely barred from recovery. 
In light of the overwhelming evidence of the bank's negligence, 
the error in Instruction No. 25 cannot be considered harmless and 
therefore the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
DATED this , day of December, 1986. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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